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This study discusses the role of domestic debt markets in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
based on a new data set covering 27 SSA countries during the 20-year period 1980–
2000. The study finds that domestic debt markets in these countries are generally
small, highly short term, and often have a narrow investor base. Domestic interest
payments present a significant burden to the budget, despite much smaller domestic
than foreign indebtedness. The use of domestic debt is also found to have signifi-
cantly crowded out private sector lending. Finally, the study identifies significant
differences among the size, cost, and maturity structure of domestic debt markets in
heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and non-HIPCs. [JEL E43, E44, H63,
O23, O55]
I
n the past decades, the external debt burden and its impact on fiscal sustain-
ability and economic growth in low-income countries have been extensively
debated. This debate has culminated in various debt reduction plans, such as 
the recent Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, which sought to
reduce the external debt stocks in these countries and free up resources for pro-
growth government spending. However, at least until recently, much less atten-
tion has been given to the issue of domestic debt in low-income countries, despite
its potentially significant impact on government budgets, macroeconomic stabil-
ity, private sector lending, and, ultimately, growth performance. Existing studies
have been limited mostly to individual country assessments in the context of the
joint World Bank and IMF Financial Sector Assessment Programs or theoretical
*Jakob Christensen is an Economist in the African Department of the IMF. The author is indebted to
Scott Rogers for his continuous advice and support. In addition, he would like to thank seminar partici-
pants at the IMF’s African Department for discussion and comments and desk economists for their gener-
ous data provision.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
519
analyses of domestic debt. Moreover, data on domestic debt are scarce and lim-
ited to a few African countries.
The main objective of this study is to discuss long-term developments and
identify key characteristics of African domestic debt markets based on a newly
collected database for 27 non-CFA1 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries for the
period 1980–2000. The discussion will focus on the following issues: (1) the
development in domestic debt markets over the period relative to various indica-
tors, such as GDP, foreign debt, and broad money; (2) the investor base of the debt
markets, especially the degree to which the bank and nonbank sectors hold domes-
tic debt; (3) the development in real treasury bill interest rates in view of the sig-
nificant financial sector reforms that have taken place over the period; (4) the
maturity structure of the domestic debt portfolio in these countries, including a
comparison with debt markets in more developed countries; and (5) the impact of
domestic borrowing on government budgets and private sector credit.
Of particular interest is the difference between domestic debt markets in
HIPCs and non-HIPCs. First, the paper examines to what extent HIPCs have relied
on foreign versus domestic debt. Given that HIPCs have access to highly conces-
sional foreign resources, it would be surprising if they had accumulated a signifi-
cant amount of domestic debt, since domestic interest rates are higher than foreign
ones. Finally, the relatively underdeveloped financial systems in many HIPCs may
have been an obstacle to developing sound and well-functioning domestic debt
markets compared with those of non-HIPCs.
I. Description of Database
This study is the first attempt to compile a comprehensive database on domestic
debt for sub-Saharan African countries. While other databases exist, they are scarce
and limited to only a few African countries. The most comprehensive database to
date is the government financial statistics in the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics. However, it contains data for only 19 of 38 non-CFA countries, and the
data for many of these countries are incomplete. Another source is the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators, but the problem of missing data is even
larger in this case.
The database for this study contains information about the characteristics of
domestic debt markets for the period 1980–2000. The study focuses on gross secu-
ritized domestic government debt, composed of treasury bills, development stocks,
and bonds. Hence, the data set excludes domestic debt arising from domestic arrears
accumulation and direct advances from the central bank and commercial banks.2
While an attempt was made to collect information on outstanding stocks of central
bank debt (since it represents a quasi-fiscal cost to the government), it was not pos-
sible to obtain information for all countries. In addition to the stock of domestic
1CFA denotes Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique.
2Most countries do not have significant stocks of direct advances, because governments generally
clear these at the end of the year through issuance of treasury bills or transfers from other government
accounts. However, a few of the countries in the database have accumulated significant stocks of direct lia-
bilities to the banking system.Jakob Christensen
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debt, the database also contains information on the maturity structure, holdings of
debt by sectors, real treasury bill interest rates, and domestic interest burden on the
budget.
The choice of countries was limited to non-CFA countries, since CFA countries
until very recently did not have any domestic debt markets. Among the non-CFA
countries,Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique,
and São Tomé and Príncipe did not have domestic government debt markets at the
time of collection. Apart from these countries, it was possible to obtain complete
series for all countries except Guinea. Information on domestic debt data was
obtained primarily from individual IMF country reports, such as recent economic
development reports and country desk databases. In cases where these were insuffi-
cient, central bank reports or IMF country desk economists helped to fill the gaps.
II. Important Aspects of Domestic Debt Management
The Need for Domestic Debt Issuance
The need to issue domestic debt can arise both from government deficits that are
not fully foreign financed and from implementation of monetary policy. Generally,
a deficit leads to a change in government net assets. Hence, a budget deficit can be
financed by either drawing down assets or incurring new liabilities, either domes-
tic or foreign. The use of assets entails selling property or reducing deposits. This
type of financing, however, is constrained by the stock and attractiveness of assets
(the feasibility of privatization), and governments, therefore, normally resort to
domestic or foreign borrowing to finance large parts of fiscal deficits. The choice
between foreign and domestic borrowing, in turn, depends on cost (interest rates),
maturity structure, and risks. Most of the SSA countries have access to foreign
financing at very low interest rates (well below market interest rates) and at very
long maturity from international aid agencies or on grant terms. These terms are
often more favorable than for domestic borrowing, since domestic debt instruments
carry much higher interest rates and have shorter maturities. Another advantage of
foreign borrowing is that it increases the supply of foreign exchange, which is crit-
ical to meet import requirements. One drawback to foreign borrowing is currency
risk, which may increase along with foreign indebtedness, given that a growing for-
eign debt service increases the demand for foreign exchange. However, Beaugrand,
Loko, and Mlachila (2002) found that highly concessional foreign loans—when
available—are still the most attractive way to finance budget deficits, even if there
are significant devaluation risks, given the high levels of domestic interest rates.
Despite the attractiveness of foreign borrowing, governments may still con-
sider domestic borrowing for a number of reasons. First, the supply of foreign
(concessional) financing may be determined by the aid agencies’budgets and their
assessment of the economic performance of the recipient country. Second, inter-
national aid is very often linked to project financing and therefore cannot finance
a government’s recurrent expenditures or capital projects not supported by donors.
Hence, governments with large recurrent budget deficits may be forced to tap
domestic savings, including through issuance of domestic debt, to close their
budget gaps.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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Domestic debt can also be used to achieve monetary policy targets. This is par-
ticularly the case in countries with large balance of payment surpluses, created by
large aid inflows or oil exports, for example. In those situations, the inflows of for-
eign exchange increase liquidity, which can undermine macroeconomic stability,
and the central banks often decide to intervene by selling government or central
bank bills to stem inflationary pressures from excess liquidity.
Macroeconomic Risks Related to Domestic Debt Financing
Extensive use of domestic borrowing can have severe repercussions on the econ-
omy. Domestic debt service can consume a significant part of government rev-
enues, especially given that domestic interest rates are higher than foreign ones.
The interest cost of domestic borrowing can rise quickly along with increases in
the outstanding stock of debt, especially in shallow financial markets. In such mar-
kets, given that financial resources are limited, expansions in domestic debt will
more easily lead to higher domestic interest rates. The increase in interest rates
may be even more pronounced if the investor base is relatively narrow, since the
government may be held hostage by a particular group of investors (World Bank
and IMF, 2001). A diverse investor base reduces the monopoly power of a partic-
ular group of investors, bringing down not only costs but also rollover risks.
Hence, an important aspect of debt management is broadening the investor base.
This can be achieved through a combination of efforts, including promoting invest-
ment by retail investors and developing and reforming pension and retirement funds
to encourage their investment in government bonds.
Another risk concerns the crowding out of private investment. When issuing
domestic debt, governments tap domestic private savings that would otherwise be
available to the private sector. This is normally followed by an increase in domes-
tic interest rates, if these are flexible, adversely affecting private investment.
However, even when interest rates are controlled, domestic borrowing can lead to
credit rationing and crowding out of private sector investment (Fischer and
Easterly, 1990). The impact of government borrowing will, to some extent, be
aggravated if there are capital account restrictions, since banks cannot as easily
circumvent higher domestic interest rates through foreign borrowing. Last, but not
least, an investor base that is dominated by commercial banks may exacerbate the
above-mentioned effect. The crowding-out effect may, therefore, be more pro-
nounced in the absence of nonbank investors, such as pension funds and retire-
ment funds, to which the government could sell its debt without necessarily
crowding out private sector credit. Hence, a diverse investor base prevents exces-
sive reliance on commercial bank funds and thereby reduces the risk of crowding
out (World Bank and IMF, 2001).
Maturity Structure
The government debt portfolio should adequately comprise short- and long-term
paper. If the debt portfolio consists mainly of short-term debt, the government may
face considerable risks. First, with more frequent rollovers, the government is highlyJakob Christensen
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vulnerable to a sudden increase in interest rates, which can raise debt service sig-
nificantly. This can lead to further deterioration in the market’s confidence in gov-
ernment bonds, prompting even higher interest rates on government debt. Second,
administrative costs tend to be higher with a short maturity structure, because the
government must frequently roll over large parts of its debt, notably in countries
without an automated book-entry system. Third, the maturity structure is important
for investors as they seek to diversify their asset portfolios. In many African coun-
tries, government debt is the only investment opportunity besides lending to the pri-
vate sector, since stock markets are either absent or highly illiquid (Gelbard and
Pereira Leite, 1999). The provision of government longer-term paper is therefore
highly important for investors to balance their long-term liabilities with long-term
assets and for banks to increase profitability by taking on interest rate risk.
However, the government may experience several obstacles in pursuing a
longer-term debt portfolio. First, the market may not be willing to hold long-term
paper in view of significant inflation and default risks. Second, it may not be suffi-
ciently advanced to demand long-term paper, especially in the absence of institu-
tional investors (Impavido, Musalem, and Tressel, 2003). Finally, the government
may hesitate to extend the maturity, since longer-term bonds can entail higher inter-
est rates, in view of a rising yield curve, which would increase financing costs.
III. Characteristics of Domestic Debt Markets 
in Non-CFA SSA Countries
Developments in Domestic Debt: 1980–2000
Table 1 shows developments in domestic and external debt for 27 non-CFA SSA
countries for the period 1980–2000. It is apparent that domestic debt is not a recent
phenomenon in African countries; most of the countries have relied on domestic
borrowing since the beginning of the observation period. However, the average
ratio of domestic debt increased from 11 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 15 percent
in the late 1990s, with the median increasing from 4 percent to 10 percent over the
same period. An increasing number of countries became heavily domestically in-
debted, and the number of countries with debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 20 percent
rose from three at the beginning of 1980 to nine by 2000.
There are wide differences across the countries with respect to the size of
government securities markets. One group of countries has relied extensively on
domestic debt since the beginning of the period. This group includes Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, South Africa,Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In con-
trast, countries such as Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe have not used or have only recently
developed government securities markets.3 Between these extremes, there is a vast
group of countries that either have fairly small debt markets or have recently expe-
rienced a considerable increase in their domestic debt burden, including The
Gambia, Ghana, Namibia, and Seychelles.
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Table 1 also shows that the domestic debt burden in HIPCs is much smaller
than in non-HIPCs. HIPCs, which, almost by definition, have relied heavily on for-
eign financing, have not developed their domestic debt markets to the same degree
as non-HIPCs. On average, domestic debt in HIPCs amounted to about 8 percent
of GDP, although this ratio increased slightly in the latter half of the 1990s, mostly
because of large increases in outstanding domestic debt in Ghana and The Gambia.
However, other HIPCs have managed to obtain significant reductions in the ratio of
domestic debt to GDP over the same period, notably Ethiopia and Zambia. In con-
trast, domestic debt markets have grown steadily in non-HIPCs, as the average ratio
of domestic debt to GDP increased from 14 percent in the 1980s to 23 percent by
the end of the 1990s.
Finally, Table 1 shows that while domestic debt stocks have grown in recent
years relative to GDP, their size is still negligible compared with the size of foreign
indebtedness. Domestic debt accounted for just over one-fifth of total debt in the
latter half of the 1990s, slightly lower than in the 1980s. However, there are marked
differences between HIPCs and non-HIPCs. While domestic debt financing has
grown relative to foreign borrowing in non-HIPCs, domestic borrowing in HIPCs
has been dominated by a huge accumulation of external debt in the 1990s. As a
result, the ratio of domestic debt to total debt between the two groups diverged sig-
nificantly in the 1990s, from relatively similar levels in the 1980s as the proportion
of domestic debt fell to less than 10 percent of total debt in HIPCs while increas-
ing to almost 40 percent in non-HIPCs by the end of the 1990s.
As mentioned above, the potential for expanding domestic debt depends on the
depth of the financial sector. A useful indicator in that regard is the ratio of broad
money to GDP. Table 2 shows that African financial sectors generally appear to be
relatively small and, on average, they tend to be much smaller in HIPCs than in
non-HIPCs. The “deepest” financial sectors were found in Cape Verde, Kenya,
Mauritius, Seychelles, and South Africa, where broad money amounted to more
than 50 percent of GDP in the late 1990s.
The small financial sectors in most countries limit the potential for expanding
domestic debt. The ratio of domestic debt to broad money is shown in Table 2. A
number of countries had very large ratios of domestic debt to broad money at the
end of the 1990s, including The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa,
and Zimbabwe. The ratio for Ghana was even larger than 100 percent. Interestingly,
the average ratio is almost the same in HIPCs as in non-HIPCs, even though the for-
mer group has much less domestic debt. In other words, the potential for expanding
domestic debt in HIPCs appears to be more limited, particularly in The Gambia,
Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania, compared with non-HIPCs, because
further expansions of domestic debt in HIPCs would decrease the availability of
commercial bank resources and, thereby, curb credit to the private sector.
The Investor Base
As mentioned above, a diverse investor base is crucial to lowering the cost of gov-
ernment debt and the volatility of market yields. Furthermore, a narrow investor
base, consisting mainly of commercial banks, increases the risk of crowding outJakob Christensen
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private investment, especially in SSA countries where private companies have to
rely on bank financing, given the absence of corporate debt markets. As such, an
important component of debt management is stimulating a diverse investor base
and developing instruments, trading facilities, and distribution networks that best
suit the needs of investors (World Bank and IMF, 2001). In most developed mar-
ket economies, there are traditionally four general categories of potential investors
Table 2. Financial Sector Depth and Domestic Debt, 1980–2000
M2 (In percent of GDP) Domestic Debt (In percent of M2)
Country 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000
Angola 107 72 18 0 0 0
Botswana 19 20 21 0 0 0
Burundi 18 18 19 19 11 30
Cape Verde 47 64 64 0 17 53
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 8 14 7 0 0 0
Ethiopia 28 41 41 57 47 25
Gambia, The 21 22 29 13 57 80
Ghana 15 16 22 83 47 106
Guinea 10 9 10 . . . . . . . . .
Kenya 29 38 50 71 63 44
Lesotho 49 34 31 18 25 16
Madagascar 21 22 21 15 13 12
Malawi 22 22 16 59 38 57
Mauritius 47 67 77 57 44 43
Mozambique 37 22 21 0 0 1
Namibia 12 30 42 0 25 44
Nigeria 27 21 17 106 137 95
Rwanda 13 16 17 62 59 30
São Tomé and Príncipe 59 31 32 0 0 0
Seychelles 32 42 78 43 107 86
Sierra Leone 19 12 14 71 38 50
South Africa 56 53 56 53 71 81
Swaziland 33 32 26 12 3 4
Tanzania 27 17 16 93 38 74
Uganda 9 8 13 24 7 16
Zambia 17 20 19 145 44 30
Zimbabwe 27 22 42 129 130 91
Average 31 30 32 39 39 42
HIPC 23 20 21 38 27 37
Decision point reached1 24 21 22 43 31 41
Eligible2 13 16 13 9 6 15
Non-HIPC3 41 41 43 41 52 46
Sources: IMF staff reports; and selected central bank statistics.
Notes: HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries; M2=M2 money supply.
1Includes Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
2Includes Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
3Includes Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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in government securities instruments: domestic and foreign and, for each of these
categories, the banking sector (composed of commercial banks as well as central
banks) and the nonbank sector, consisting of the contractual savings sector (pen-
sion funds), collective investment funds, and nonfinancial entities such as non-
financial corporations and individual investors. The presence of foreign investors
in African securities markets is generally limited. To date, only a few countries
have had active participation of foreign investors in their debt markets, which
may be a result of underdeveloped trading facilities, high country risk, and capital
account restrictions.
Commercial banks are the main holders of government debt in the African
debt market, holding half of all outstanding domestic debt (Table 3). While they
enjoy a relatively high income from government debt, their large holdings of
domestic debt may reflect some fundamental shortcomings in their commercial
banking operations (World Bank and IMF, 2001). These shortcomings include
institutional weaknesses that undermine lending to the private sector, given inef-
fective screening and monitoring capabilities of loans, little reliable information
on creditworthy borrowers, and weak legal systems (such as a lack of commercial
courts to settle payment disputes).4
The nonbank sector was found to be the second biggest holder, accounting for
one-third of outstanding debt. The limited role played by the nonbank sector com-
pared with commercial banks may be attributed to the absence of large-scale insti-
tutional investors in the nonbank sector. However, the nonbank sector has played
an important role in Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Rwanda, and South Africa.
Insurance companies and pension funds were in these cases the most common
investors, but building societies, post office savings banks, public enterprises, and
the general public also played a role.
Finally, central banks accounted for a modest share of government debt, with
the exception of Burundi, Nigeria, and Tanzania. While such holdings can be uti-
lized for monetary policy purposes, central bank purchases of government debt are
basically identical to monetizing budget deficits.
Real Treasury Bill Rates and Financial Sector Reforms
Financial systems in most African countries were highly controlled in the 1980s.
However, many countries embarked on a series of financial sector reforms in the late
1980s aimed at liberalizing their financial sectors to improve financial inter-
mediation. In many cases, these reforms included a move toward more liberal gov-
ernment debt markets based on flexible and market-determined interest rates,
subject to the level of inflation, the amount of outstanding debt, and the risk of
default. This replaced a system in which the government often had forced the state-
controlled financial system to hold government debt despite minimal returns.
4A good measure of these shortcomings is the number of nonperforming loans (NPLs). Mehran and
others (1998) found that the ratio of NPLs to total loans averaged 16 percent in 16 non-CFA countries. The
ratio was significantly higher for HIPCs than for non-HIPCs, with almost one-fourth of total loans
recorded as NPLs in the former group.Jakob Christensen
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Whereas real interest rates on bonds were often negative in the prereform period,
in the early 1990s they needed to increase to more positive realms to make bonds
attractive.
The positive impact of these reforms on financial development and liberal-
ization is evident from the index numbers in the first two columns of Table 4.
These numbers are drawn from Gelbard and Pereira Leite (1999) and comprise
six subcategories, each based on the following additional subindicators: (1) mar-
ket structure, (2) financial products, (3) financial liberalization, (4) institutional
environment, (5) financial openness, and (6) monetary policy instruments. A
higher index number corresponds to a more developed financial system. It can be
Table 3. Holdings of Government Debt Across Sectors
(In percent)
Banking Sector
Country Total Central bank Commercial banks Nonbank Sector
Burundi 77 55 22 23
Cape Verde 78 30 48 22
Ethiopia 81 24 57 19
Gambia, The 52 0 52 48
Ghana 66 27 39 34
Kenya 50 11 39 50
Lesotho 81 1 80 19
Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malawi 100 0 100 0
Mauritius 45 5 40 55
Nigeria 96 66 30 4
Rwanda 21 0 21 79
Seychelles 86 0 86 14
Sierra Leone 63 4 60 37
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swaziland 66 0 66 34
Tanzania 86 44 42 14
Uganda 90 17 73 10
Zambia 78 0 77 22
Zimbabwe 53 19 35 47
Average 70 17 54 30
HIPC 71 17 54 29
Decision point reached1 71 13 58 29
Eligible2 77 55 22 23
Non-HIPC3 69 16 53 31
Note: HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
1Includes Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
2Includes Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
3Includes Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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Table 4. Financial Development, Real Treasury Bill Rates,
and Private Sector Lending, 1980–2000
Financial 
Development  Real Treasury Bill Rates Credit to Private Sector
(Index)1 (In percent) (In percent of broad money)
Country 1987 1997 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000
Angola 9 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Botswana 47 62 . . . . . . . . . 40 54 51
Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 63 72
Cape Verde 34 54 ... ... 6 ... ... 4 4
Congo, Dem. 20 52 . . . . . . . . . 23 7 . . .
Rep. of
Ethiopia 9 23 (2) (5) 2 11 9 46
Gambia, The 43 60 (4) 9 11 77 44 36
Ghana 31 75 (32) 5 5 19 26 38
Guinea 30 50 . . . 14 8 . . . . . . . . .
Kenya 44 75 5 81 56 8 5 76 0
Lesotho 20 44 (1) (0) 5 26 48 53
Madagascar 38 63 . . . (11) (1) 103 79 48
Malawi 24 47 (6) (2) (4) 61 51 29
Mauritius 62 85 (2) 0 3 53 56 68
Mozambique 24 53 . . . . . . 9 . . . 43 58
Namibia 42 72 . . . 3 8 . . . 90 96
Nigeria 27 61 (12) (19) (10) 52 47 65
Rwanda . . . . . . . . . 49 43 53
São Tomé and  22 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Príncipe
Seychelles 8 11 6 36 18 19
Sierra Leone (49) (15) (2) 22 25 19
South Africa 77 87 (2) 1 7 93 110 121
Swaziland 43 60 (4) 0 4 65 75 64
Tanzania 30 65 . . . 17 2 14 54 22
Uganda 36 64 (101) 2 4 29 40 38
Zambia 47 75 (27) (71) 9 40 36 41
Zimbabwe 38 65 (5) (4) 2 43 84 89
Average 34 58 (16) (3) 4 46 50 51
HIPC 28 53 (32) (6) 4 41 40 40
Decision point  29 53 (32) (6) 4 42 41 38
reached2
Eligible3 20 52 . . . . . . . . . 32 35 72
Non-HIPC4 40 62 (1) (0) 4 53 64 62
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; and Gelbard and Pereira Leite (1999).
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are negative; HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
1Numbers based on Gelbard and Leite (1999).
2Includes Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
3Includes Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
4Includes Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.Jakob Christensen
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seen that the financial systems improved in virtually all countries, with the largest
improvements observed in HIPCs (although they came from the lowest base).
The liberalization of the financial system appears to have been accompanied by
a sharp rise in real interest rates (Table 4). At the end of the 1990s, all countries had
positive real treasury bill rates except for Madagascar, Malawi, Nigeria, and Sierra
Leone. In comparison, 13 of 15 countries for which data were available had nega-
tive real treasury bill rates during the 1980s. In contrast, real treasury bill rates in The
Gambia and Kenya exceeded 10 percent at the end of the 1990s. As noted above,
financial sectors in HIPCs developed more rapidly than in non-HIPCs, and this may
also explain why they witnessed the largest increase in real treasury bill rates, from
an average of −32 percent in the 1980s to 4 percent by the end of the 1990s. In con-
trast, securities markets in non-HIPCs were already relatively liberal in the 1980s,
and only small increases were needed to achieve positive real treasury bill rates.
Maturity Structure
The maturity structure of government debt can affect both the costs and risks of
using domestic debt instruments. In general, the government should attempt to
issue debt whose maturity mirrors the maturity structure of short-term current and
long-term capital expenditures. However, governments may be tempted to issue
mainly short-term debt if the yield curve slopes sufficiently upward. Furthermore,
while there are obvious benefits to extending the maturity structure, including a
reduction in market and rollover risks, the market may not be ready to absorb long-
term paper, especially if there is considerable macroeconomic instability. In addi-
tion, the absence of a contractual savings sector and mutual funds with sufficiently
long investment horizons may also limit the ability of the government to extend
the maturity structure. To some extent, the length of the maturity structure can be
viewed as a measure of the degree of market development.
Short-term paper dominates debt markets in Africa (Figure 1). Three-month
bills are the most frequently used, accounting for almost 50 percent of outstand-
ing debt stocks (implying that African governments, on average, must roll over
half of their debt portfolio four times a year). The second most common maturity
is 12 months, accounting for about one-fifth of the bonds, while one-tenth of all
bonds have a 6-month maturity.
The average maturity for the African countries is 231 days, or about 10 months
(Table 5). Domestic debt markets in HIPCs appear to have the shortest maturity
structure: 177 days. Burundi has the shortest average maturity, with 77 days,
closely followed by Uganda, with 93 days. In contrast, non-HIPCs benefiting from
more sophisticated markets have longer maturities: South Africa and Swaziland top
the list with an average maturity length of 1,748 and 1,145 days, respectively.
As mentioned above, the dominance of short-term paper in African securities
markets greatly increases rollover and market risk, especially in countries with
large outstanding debt stocks. Financial liberalization has led to more interest rate
flexibility and made countries with a large amount of short-term debt vulnerable
to changes in market conditions. Some governments must roll over debt amount-























































































































































































































































































The short-term nature of African debt markets is even more evident compared
with debt markets in more developed countries. In six developed and emerging
market countries for which data were available, the average maturity was about five
and half years, or seven times longer than in African countries. Roughly speaking,
maturity length seems to be more closely related to general economic development
(in terms of per capita income) than to the size of debt markets (relative to GDP).
As a country gains wealth (with the exception of India) and the demand for more
sophisticated economic arrangements expands, the need for longer-term savings
instruments increases. This implies that as African countries continue to develop,
their debt markets may be expected to become more advanced and long term. This
would help reduce the significant risks of portfolios that are dominated by short-
term debt. A word of caution may be necessary in that some fairly poor countries
Table 5. Average Maturity of Domestic Debt 
for Selected African Countries and Emerging Market Countries
Domestic Debt/GDP  GDP Per Capita  Maturity 
Country (In percent)1 (In U.S. dollars)2 (In days)
Burundi 9 141 77
Uganda 2 348 93
Gambia, The 31 371 112
Ghana 29 413 122
Malawi 11 169 177
Sierra Leone 10 147 190
Lesotho 11 551 203
Nigeria 21 254 228
Cape Verde 26 1,519 256
Zambia 5 392 296
Rwanda 6 242 351
Kenya 22 328 382
Namibia 19 2,408 859
Swaziland 1 1,476 1,145
South Africa 41 3,985 1,748
Average 15 850 231
HIPC 13 293 177
Non-HIPC 17 1,089 512
Memorandum items:
Mexico 23 3,819 720
Brazil . . . 4,624 1,085
Italy 105 20,885 1,376
Lithuania . . . 2,056 1,715
India . . . 459 3,050
New Zealand 35 17,548 3,720
Average 54 8,232 1,945
Sources: Selected country staff reports; World Bank and IMF (2001).
Note: HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
1Data for 2000.
2GDP per capita (at constant 1995 U.S. dollars) in 2000.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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have expanded their debt markets significantly in relatively undeveloped financial
market settings—thereby ending up with sizable amounts of short-term debt, caus-
ing a significant burden on, and risk to, the budget.
IV. The Impact of Domestic Debt on the Budget 
and Private Sector Credit
Budget Implications
A key concern regarding domestic debt management is the cost, in terms of amor-
tization and interest payments, to the budget. This section will focus on interest,
since most African governments have been net borrowers in domestic markets,
rolling over existing debt. Two issues deserve attention: (1) the interest burden on
the budget and (2) the relative cost of domestic versus foreign borrowing.
Domestic interest payments are sizable compared with revenues and GDP
(Table 6). Average interest payments, as a percentage of revenues, increased in both
HIPCs and non-HIPCs over the period 1980–2000. However, there are large varia-
tions among countries—Ethiopia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Nigeria, and Rwanda have
cut their interest payments significantly as their debt stocks have fallen. In contrast,
The Gambia, Ghana, Malawi, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe have witnessed a sharp
increase in domestic interest payments, to more than 15 percent of their revenues.
Relative to GDP, domestic interest payments, on average, account for more than
2 percent of GDP in these countries. The ratio is slightly higher in non-HIPCs than
in HIPCs.
Surprisingly, domestic interest payments are as large as foreign ones, despite
much lower levels of domestic than foreign debt. In fact, domestic interest pay-
ments exceeded foreign interest payments in 10 (half of which were HIPCs) of the
22 countries for which data were available. Despite the drastic decline in domestic-
to-total-debt ratio in HIPCs, domestic interest payments as a percentage of total
interest payments remained relatively constant at about 40 percent throughout the
period. Furthermore, domestic interest payments in HIPCs account for almost the
same share of total interest payments as in non-HIPCs, despite much smaller
domestic debt relative to foreign debt in HIPCs. Hence, in addition to the large for-
eign interest burden, recently highlighted by the HIPC Initiative, African govern-
ments have to pay a significant part of their revenues to service domestic debt.
The significant domestic interest burden is a result of relatively high domestic
interest rates. Various comparisons of the cost of domestic versus foreign borrow-
ing suggest that domestic interest rates are much higher than foreign ones (Table 7).
To  measure the cost of borrowing, the average implicit interest rates for both
domestic and foreign borrowing were calculated by dividing the interest payments
in the budget by the actual debt stock.5At the end of the 1990s, the implicit domes-
5A more common approach is to look at the uncovered interest rate parity. However, using foreign
market interest rates for African countries may overstate the cost, since most of their borrowing is on
highly concessional terms with interest rates well below market rates. The implicit interest rate calculates
the average interest rate, which takes into account (ex post) exchange rate depreciation.Jakob Christensen
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Table 6. Domestic Interest Payments, 1980–2000
In Percent of  In Percent of 
Total Debt Service Revenues1 In Percent of GDP
1980– 1990–94 1995– 1980– 1990–94 1995– 1980– 1990–94 1995–
Country 1989 2000 1989 2000 1989 2000
Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burundi 54.8 28.0 34.5 2.9 2.9 5.1 0.5 0.5 0.9
Cape Verde 20.4 38.8 69.2 1.8 2.4 11.0 0.3 0.5 2.2
Congo, Dem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rep. of
Ethiopia 74.6 68.8 64.9 4.1 11.6 8.1 0.8 1.5 1.5
Gambia, The 33.4 53.9 72.8 6.7 9.1 18.1 1.4 2.0 3.3
Ghana . . . 66.6 73.6 . . . 11.9 24.4 . . . 1.8 4.3
Guinea . . . 4.0 14.4 . . . 0.6 2.0 . . . 0.1 0.2
Kenya 64.1 71.7 74.5 13.4 22.2 15.9 3.1 5.7 4.2
Lesotho . . . 70.2 40.6 5.0 6.3 1.7 1.8 2.6 0.7
Madagascar 21.0 32.5 20.7 2.5 9.4 5.9 0.3 0.9 0.6
Malawi 92.1 54.8 64.4 24.1 10.5 17.4 4.6 2.0 2.9
Mauritius 62.8 80.6 85.8 14.7 13.2 14.9 3.3 3.0 2.9
Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 54.7 38.1 37.4 20.6 25.4 9.7 2.2 3.3 1.6
Rwanda 63.9 71.4 41.0 4.1 25.1 7.4 0.6 1.6 0.6
São Tomé and  . . . . . . 2.5 . . . . . . 1.3 . . . . . . 0.2
Príncipe
Seychelles . . . . . . 85.7 . . . . . . 16.8 . . . . . . 7.5
Sierra Leone 42.9 31.2 48.7 17.4 11.7 24.9 1.3 1.3 2.0
South Africa 95.5 97.9 96.1 12.4 19.1 22.1 2.9 4.4 5.3
Swaziland 32.5 16.8 25.1 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1
Tanzania 78.3 51.9 54.5 11.9 8.8 10.6 1.6 1.1 1.4
Uganda . . . 14.4 29.4 . . . 3.2 2.6 . . . 0.2 0.3
Zambia 33.4 29.7 31.5 11.0 11.3 10.2 2.4 3.0 2.0
Zimbabwe 72.1 72.3 73.7 9.9 12.9 21.7 2.7 3.4 6.0
Average 56.0 49.7 51.9 9.7 10.9 11.5 1.8 2.0 2.3
HIPC 54.9 42.3 42.5 9.4 9.7 10.6 1.5 1.3 1.6
Decision point  54.9 43.6 43.2 10.2 10.3 11.1 1.6 1.4 1.6
reached2
Eligible3 54.8 28.0 34.5 2.9 2.9 5.1 0.5 0.5 0.9
Non-HIPC4 57.5 60.8 65.3 9.9 12.7 12.7 2.1 2.9 3.4
Sources: IMF, staff reports and International Financial Statistics.
Note: HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
1Excluding grants.
2Includes Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda,
São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
3Includes Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
4Includes Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria,
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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Table 7. The Cost of Domestic and Foreign Borrowing
Nominal Treasury Bill Rate1 Implicit Domestic2 Implicit Foreign2
Country 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000 1980–89 1990–94 1995–2000
Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burundi . . . . . . 12 16 25 16 2 1 1
Cape Verde . . . ... 8 ... 2 6 2 2 2
Congo, Dem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rep. of
Ethiopia 3 7 6 5 9 14 1 1 1
Gambia, The 13 17 14 32 16 15 3 2 1
Ghana 17 28 37 . . . 31 19 . . . 2 2
Guinea . . . 18 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Kenya 12 33 22 13 24 20 3 3 3
Lesotho 13 13 13 11 29 18 2 2 2
Madagascar . . . 14 16 9 31 26 2 2 2
Malawi 12 18 35 36 24 38 2 2 1
Mauritius 10 9 10 13 10 9 5 3 3
Mozambique . . . . . . 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Namibia . . . 15 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 9 17 13 7 12 10 5 6 4
Rwanda 8 . . . . . . 8 17 12 1 1 1
São Tomé and  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2
Príncipe
Seychelles 12 13 9 . . . . . . 8 . . . . . . 6
Sierra Leone 14 50 20 17 31 27 3 3 1
South Africa 13 14 14 10 12 12 . . . . . . . . .
Swaziland 11 11 12 13 13 13 2 3 3
Tanzania . . . 47 17 8 17 12 1 1 1
Uganda 21 27 10 . . . 35 16 . . . 2 1
Zimbabwe 8 22 37 8 12 18 4 4 3
Average 12 22 18 14 21 17 3 2 2
HIPC 12 28 20 16 25 21 2 2 1
Decision point  12 28 20 16 25 21 2 2 1
reached3
Eligible4 ... ... 8 ... 2 6 2 2 2
Non-HIPC5 11 16 15 11 14 12 3 3 3
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics and country reports; and author’s calculations.
Note: HIPC=Heavily Indebted Poor Countries.
1Nominal treasury bill rates.
2The implicit interest rate was calculated by dividing the interest payments in the budget by the actual debt stock
and multiplying by 100.
3Includes Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, São Tomé and
Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Uganda.
4Includes Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
5Includes Angola, Botswana, Cape Verde, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South
Africa, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe.Jakob Christensen
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tic interest rate was found to average about 17 percent, compared with 2 percent for
foreign borrowing. At the same time, implicit domestic borrowing costs were found
to be higher in HIPCs than in non-HIPCs. Implicit domestic interest rates are sim-
ilar to nominal treasury bill rates.
What makes a government borrow domestically when the interest rates are
much higher? First, amortization on external borrowings requires foreign exchange.
Hence, external vulnerability may increase dramatically if external indebtedness
rises significantly. In contrast, the authorities can, at least in the short run, roll over
domestic debt without major macroeconomic implications. Second, to limit exter-
nal vulnerability, many Fund-supported programs in poor countries include a cap
on nonconcessional borrowing. Thus, if the governments in these countries cannot
obtain sufficient concessional foreign assistance to meet their financing require-
ments, they must resort to relatively expensive domestic borrowing rather than fill-
ing the financing gap by more favorable nonconcessional foreign borrowing.
Impact on Private Sector Credit
As mentioned above, domestic debt can crowd out private sector credit with ad-
verse consequences for private investment. To examine this effect, a simple panel
data model was estimated, regressing private sector lending on domestic debt (both
variables were in percentage of broad money) for the 27 countries over the period
1980–2000. The results from this regression (shown in Table 8) yielded significant
support for the crowding-out hypothesis: on average across countries, an expansion
in domestic debt of 1 percent relative to broad money causes the ratio of private sec-
tor lending to broad money to decline by 0.15 percent.
The Gambia showed one of the strongest decreases in the ratio of private sec-
tor lending to broad money, dropping from about three-fourths to about one-third
during the 20-year period from 1980 to 2000. This coincided with a strong expan-
sion in domestic borrowing as the ratio of domestic debt to broad money rose to
106 percent by the end of the 1990s from an average of 13 percent in the 1980s.
Another interesting case is Malawi, which witnessed a sharp reduction in private
sector lending in the latter half of the 1990s. Despite a relatively small ratio of
domestic debt to GDP, domestic debt assumed a relatively large proportion of
broad money, given the relatively underdeveloped financial sector (see Table 4).
One exception is South Africa, where the ratio of credit to the private sector
increased despite expansion in domestic debt. This can be attributed to the small
Table 8. Regression Results
Domestic Debt Constant
Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error Observations R2
Private Sector Credit −0.15 (0.03) 52.7 (1.54) 492 0.0007
Note: Both variables in percent of M2.DOMESTIC DEBT MARKETS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
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commercial bank holdings of government debt, which helped reduce the negative
impact of debt expansion on private sector lending.
V. Conclusion, Policy Implications, and Need for Reforms
This study has examined different features of domestic debt markets in non-CFA
sub-Saharan African countries. Overall, the use of domestic debt instruments is
not a recent phenomenon; 19 out of 27 countries had domestic debt markets in
1980, a number that had increased to 21 by the year 2000. The ratio of domestic
debt increased from 11 percent in the 1980s to 15 percent of GDP by the end of
the 1990s. However, the domestic debt burden is still small compared with foreign
indebtedness.
Even though the ratio of domestic debt to GDP is modest, domestic borrowing
still assumes a large part of financial resources, given the thin and shallow financial
markets in the countries. The ratio of domestic debt to broad money was constant
at about 40 percent throughout the period, although some countries had ratios of
almost 100 percent. Because commercial banks hold more than half of the out-
standing domestic debt, expansion in domestic debt has had a significant negative
impact on private sector lending. The nonbank sector plays a limited role, given a
relatively underdeveloped institutional investment sector in many of the countries.
In addition, domestic markets were mainly short term, with the most common
maturity being three months; the average maturity for 15 SSA countries for which
data were available was only 231 days, far shorter than in selected emerging mar-
ket countries.
Domestic debt financing was found to be much more expensive than foreign
borrowing. This may be explained by the ongoing financial liberalization, which
has resulted in sharply rising real treasury bill rates, but also by the fact that most
countries borrow externally on highly concessional terms. Consequently, domestic
interest payments present the same burden to the budget as the foreign debt does,
even though the domestic debt burden comprises only a fraction of the total debt
burden. While domestic interest payments, on average, assumed about one-tenth
of total revenue, some countries, such as The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, have to set aside more than
15 percent of their revenues to pay interest on domestic debt.
The study also identified marked differences in the size, cost, and maturity of
domestic debt markets between HIPCs and non-HIPCs. Given the significant
reliance on external financing, HIPCs have accumulated less domestic debt,
although some face a significant domestic debt burden in addition to their large
stock of foreign debt. Despite the lower domestic-debt-to-GDP ratio, HIPCs have
an almost identical ratio of domestic debt to broad money, given the smaller
degree of financial intermediation than in non-HIPCs. Thus, further expansions in
domestic debt are more likely to crowd out private investments in HIPCs. HIPCs
embarked on comprehensive financial liberalization in the first part of the 1990s,
and real interest rates surged considerably as a result. This, combined with a high
degree of concessional foreign borrowing, explains why domestic interest pay-
ments almost equal foreign ones in these countries, despite smaller amounts ofJakob Christensen
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domestic debt. Further, governments in HIPCs face a much higher market risk as
a result of the shorter maturity structure of domestic debt than do governments in
non-HIPCs.
The significant debt problems in many countries, both domestic and foreign,
raise considerable concern about fiscal sustainability. In the worst case, these debt
problems may call for reforms. One option would be to pursue debt reduction
schemes for domestic debt similar to the HIPC Initiative. However, an outright
reduction in domestic debt would increase liquidity in the system and thereby
endanger macroeconomic stability. Instead, one might consider a debt reduction
scheme similar to that enacted in Cape Verde, whereby a donor-financed trust fund
was established. The foreign exchange from this fund was used to retire domestic
debt without injecting liquidity into the system, because the foreign exchange
transaction essentially absorbed the liquidity.
Another consideration is that countries could benefit from extending the matu-
rity structure of domestic debt, since Africa’s debt markets tend to be of an
extremely short duration. While this might entail greater debt-service costs to gov-
ernments, since bonds with longer terms may carry higher interest rates, it would
lower the significant market and rollover risks that they currently face. In light of
these countries’ nascent capital markets, such reforms should be accompanied by
broader reforms that promote long-term paper and strengthen and expand the
insurance and pension sectors as well as corporate governance and institutions.
Finally, domestic debt markets would greatly benefit from improved foreign
access to holdings of domestic debt. In addition to strengthening competition,
which would reduce financing costs, a strong foreign investor presence would con-
tribute to the introduction of financial technology and innovation, thereby leading
to higher market efficiency.
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